ABSTRACT With the rapid development of cloud storage and quantum computing, ensuring the integrity of the outsourced data for data owners becomes a serious concern. To address this problem, the existing protocols for auditing cloud storage are usually based on the post-quantum cryptographies to check data integrity. Nevertheless, these protocols employ heavy cryptographic operations to construct the data tags, making their efficiency low and extensibility poor. In this paper, we take a new perspective and explore the possibility of designing secure cloud storage (SCS) protocols based on the ring learning with errors problem. Instead of matrix variables, our protocol only utilizes vector variables to generate data block tags so that it has a much lower computational complexity. We then give a strict security proof of cheating resistance against the malicious cloud and privacy guarantee against the curious third-party auditor. We also extend the proposed protocol to support data dynamics and batch auditing for more application scenarios. As a further contribution, we summarize a systematic framework for designing the lattice-based SCS protocols. Finally, exhaustive performance analysis and comparison are provided to verify that the proposed protocol outperforms the existing lattice-based SCS protocols in terms of both operational efficiency and functional extensibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is becoming a common practice thanks to the rising popularity of cloud computing [1] . However, outsourcing data to the cloud also brings new security challenges. Firstly, despite strong security measures taken by cloud services providers (CSP), outsourced data still faces a large amount of internal and external attacks [2] , [3] . Secondly, CSPs are motivated to discard data that are rarely accessed to reclaim storage for more profit [4] , [5] . Thirdly, in case of data loss incidents, CSPs have incentives to hide the truth and cheat that the outsourced data are still undamaged for their own benefits [6] , [7] . Therefore, it is important for data owners to have the ability to check the integrity of the outsourced data.
A secure cloud storage (SCS) protocol should satisfy several substantial requirements [8] - [11] . 1) Public auditing.
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An SCS protocol should support public auditing. Specifically, the integrity auditing task can be outsourced to a third-party auditor (TPA), which is more professional and fairer in case of data loss. 2) High Efficiency. The operating efficiency of an SCS protocol should be as high as possible. 3) Strong Extensibility. An SCS protocol should be easily extended to support other common functions, such as data dynamics and batch auditing. In summary, it is better for an SCS protocol to involve only light cryptographic operations, and support public auditing, data dynamics, and batch auditing. In addition, an SCS protocol also requires that data owners have the ability to verify data integrity without physically possessing the actual data, which can hugely relieve the userside storage burden.
Previous SCS protocols always take advantage of classic cryptographies, such as RSA and discrete logarithm problem. Specifically, these protocols explore classic cryptographies to generate the outsourced data and the integrity proof, which are utilized to perform the data auditing task. However, these SCS protocols can no longer work well in front of quantum attacks. To address this problem, the research direction is shifting to design SCS protocols based on post-quantum cryptographies. As we know, lattice cryptography is one of the most famous post-quantum cryptographies, which is widely accepted to be secure against quantum attacks [12] , [13] . Thus, the anti-quantum computing SCS protocols are usually designed based on lattice cryptographies [14] - [17] . Nevertheless, all of the existing lattice-based protocols compute data tags using matrix variables, which results in low efficiency and poor extensibility. In stark contrast, in this paper, we propose to design the SCS protocol based on equality checking in the ring learning with error (RLWE) problem, utilizing only vector variables to generate data tags. Our design has both conceptual and technical novelty.
We first propose an SCS protocol based on RLWE. Then, we present two security games to formalize a security model of SCS protocols. These two games are designed based on cheating resistance against the malicious cloud and privacy guanrantee against the curious TPA respectively, which captures the security intuition in practice. Then, we propose an efficient algorithm to support data dynamics, which includes inserting, deleting and modifying user data. Specifically, we utilize a constant-size cache to maintain the relationship between the indices of data blocks and their tags. In this way, tag re-computation after each data update can be avoided and then data dynamics can be handled efficiently. Through aggregating multiple verification equations into a single one, the proposed SCS protocol can efficiently support batch auditing, i.e., the TPA can audit multiple users' data at the same time. Finaly, we establish a generic framework for designing SCS protocols based on lattice cryptographies by exploring the intrinsic relationship between SCS and lattice cryptographies.
Our key contributions are summarized as follows.
• We propose an SCS protocol based on RLWE, denoted as RLWE-SCS, which can effectively thwart quantum attacks. RLWE-SCS involves only vector variables, thus being quite efficient, which is also proved to be secure in the standard model. We further present a generic way to design SCS protocols based on lattice cryptographies.
• We explore two security games to formalize the security model of SCS protocols. The proposed security model is the standard model without any random oracle assumption involved.
• We extend the proposed SCS protocol to support data dynamics and batch auditing. For data dynamics, we utilize a constant cache to track data block changes in a lightweight way. For batch auditing, we utilize an aggregating technique to audit multiple users' data simultaneously.
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed RLWE-SCS protocol through exhaustive analysis and comparison, which verifies its superiority over the existing latticebased SCS protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the preliminary of this paper. In Section III, we first depict the system model of SCS protocols, and then outline the security model. In Section IV, we illustrate the design of RLWE-SCS. In Section V, we analyze the proposed protocol in theory. In Section VI, we extend the proposed protocol to support data dynamics. In Section VII, we present a batch auditing SCS protocol based on RLWE. In Section VIII, we give a systematic framework of designing SCS protocols based on lattice cryptographies. In Section IX, we present performance evaluation, and we summarize our work in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section introduces the notations and the mathematical knowledge adopted in this paper.
A. NOTATIONS
Denote Z n as the set {0, 1, . . ., n}, and Z m n as m random numbers chosen from Z n . a ← U b is denoted as the elementwise production of a and b. a · b is denoted as the element-wise production of a and b. For simplicity of description, a vector and its corresponding polynomial are denoted as the same notation. H K (·) is a secure hash function [18] : {0, 1} * → R q , which is the K -th element in the pseudo-random function family {H (·)}.
Denote R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) as a cyclotomic ring with integer polynomials, whose degrees are at most n − 1. Let R q = R/qR be a ring, which is generated by performing modulo q on polynomial coefficients of R. Note that R and R q are also two lattices. For any m, n > 1, R 1×n q and R n q are denoted as the 1 × n row vector and n × 1 column vector with ring elements in R q , respectively. Denote ⊂ R n as an n-th dimensional lattice with elements in the set of real numbers R, D ,c,σ as an n-th dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution over with the center c ∈ R n and the distribution parameter σ ∈ R. Let x ← D ,c,σ be a sample in with the probability ρ(x)/ z∈ ρ(z), where ρ = exp(−π x − c /σ 2 ) is any Gaussian function and z is the lattice basis of . When omitted, c = 0 and σ = 1.
B. RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS
This subsection introduces the RLWE hardness assumption adopted in this paper. Let r be a polynomial in R q with arbitrary dimension. 
To hold the RLWE hardness assumption, the ring dimension n and the modulo q should satisfy n ≥ log 2 (q/σ ) 4log 2 (σ ) , where VOLUME 7, 2019 σ is the root Hermite factor. More information can be found in [19] and [20] .
C. DISCRETE GAUSSIAN SAMPLING
Generally, it is hard to compute α ← D R n q ,σ that satisfies Aα = β since its hardness assumption is based on the approximate shortest independent vector problem, where A ← U R 1×n q and β ∈ R q . However, this hard problem can be solved well in the case that its trapdoor T A is given in advance. Next, we show Theorem 1 to compute A and its trapdoor T A [21] . 
The empirical constant C can be found in [24] .
III. SECURE CLOUD STORAGE
This section illustrates the system and security models of SCS protocols.
A. SYSTEM MODEL Initially, there are two entities involved in SCS protocols. One is the data owners having plenty of data to be stored; the other is the cloud with massive resources. The user outsources its data to the cloud, and then ensures its data integrity through auditing queries. However, both of these two entities might be dishonest on behalf of their own benefits, which incurs potential disputes about auditing results. To address this problem, a third-party auditor is introduced to perform data auditing task in the SCS protocols, who has more expertise and capabilities than a single user. Due to its neutrality and objectivity, TPA can effectively settle the auditing disputes between the cloud and its users. Thus, the latter SCS protocols usually contains three entities, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . This paper follows the classical SCS framework to design the detailed protocols, which are commonly adapted in the previous works. Generally, SCS protocols consist of five parts, i.e., SCS = (KeyGen, Outsource, Audit, Prove, Verify). The details are shown in the following.
• KeyGen(ρ) → (SK, PK): With the input of a security level ρ, the user outputs a secret key SK and a public key PK. • Outsource(D; SK, PK)→ T: With the input of user data D, the user outputs the outsourced data T to be stored on the cloud.
• Audit(ρ) → γ : With the input of the security level ρ, the TPA outputs an auditing request γ .
• Prove(γ , T; PK)→ : With the input of the auditing request γ and the outsourced data T, the cloud outputs an integrity proof .
• Verify(γ , ; SK, PK)→ q: With the input of the audit request γ and the integrity proof , the TPA outputs a boolean value q, which indicates whether the stored data remains undamaged.
B. SECURITY MODEL
Intuitively, there are two security properties in SCS protocols: cheating resistance and privacy guarantee. Next, we describe these two security properties in detail. 1) Cheating resistance. In reality, the cloud might lose the outsourced data because of software bug, hardware failure, hacker attack, etc. For economic benefit and reputation, the cloud has incentives to hide its data loss from both the data owners and TPA. The common cheating tricks adopted by the cloud are summarized as follows [10] :
• Forge attack. The cloud might forge user data in order to pass the integrity verification of the TPA.
• Replace attack. The cloud might utilize undamaged user data to replace the challenged data that is already corrupted.
• Replay attack. The cloud might generate integrity proofs using the previous proofs, instead of the actual user data. To address these security challenges, the TPA must have the ability to resist the cloud cheating behaviors. The cheating resistance usually consists of two parties. One is that the cloud without intact data cannot pass the TPA integrity verification with a non-negligible probability. The other is that the user can successfully reconstruct its data from the valid integrity proof. Denote the adversary A as the malicious cloud, the challenger C as both the data owner and the TPA. Next, we formalize the cheating resistance for an SCS protocol using the following security game, which is denoted as SG 1 and depicted in Fig. 2 . • KeyGen(ρ) → (SK, PK): Given the security level ρ, C invokes SCS.KeyGen to output SK and PK, and forwards PK to A.
• Audit(ρ) → γ : Given the security level ρ, C invokes SCS.Audit to output an auditing request γ , which is sent to A.
• Prove(γ , p ; PK)→ : There are two ways to generate a forged integrity proof. With the input of an auditing request γ and a previous integrity proof p , -A launches forge and replace attacks to produce the challenged data and then invokes SCS.Outsource to generate the outsourced data. At last, A invokes SCS.Prove to generate the corresponding integrity proof , which is sent to the challenger C. -A launches replay attack and then directly responses the integrity proof = p to the challenger C.
• Verify(γ , ; PK)→ q 1 : With the input of the auditing request γ and the integrity proof , C runs SCS.Verify to output a boolean value q 1 , denoting the integrity status of the challenged data.
• Reconstruct(γ , ; SK, PK)→ q 2 : With the input of the auditing request γ and the integrity proof , C reconstructs the challenged user data, which is denoted as D e . C compares the original data D with the reconstructed data D e and then outputs q 2 , where q 2 = 1 if D e = D and q 2 = 0 otherwise. We state the adversary A wins the game if
, where negl(ρ) represents a negligible function with the input of ρ. Namely, the TPA cannot distinguish whether the data is lost or not, and the user would believe that the forged data is its actual data. Thereafter, an SCS protocol without cheating resistance is obviously insecure. Based on the above discussions, we give the following security definition.
Definition 3: An SCS protocol is cheating resistant if Pr[SG
2) Privacy guarantee. In an SCS protocol, the TPA is required to achieve no information of the cloud user data. We utilize another security game SG 2 to formalize this model, which is depicted in Fig. 3 . Let the adversary A denote the malicious TPA, the challenger C denote both the data owner and the cloud. The details of SG 2 are as follows.
• DataGen(ρ)→ (SK , PK , T ): Given the input of the security level ρ, C runs SCS.KeyGen to generate SK and PK , and forwards PK to A. C generates the random data D, and then runs SCS.Outsource to generate the corresponding outsourced data T .
• Audit(ρ) → γ : Given the input of the security level ρ, A invokes SCS.Audit to output an auditing request γ .
• Prove(γ , T ; PK)→ : Given the input of the auditing request γ and the outsourced data T , C invokes SCS.Prove to output an integrity proof , which is sent to the adversary A.
• Reconstruct(γ , ; PK)→ q 3 : With the input of the audit request γ and the integrity proof , A recovers the challenged user data, which is denoted as D e . Then, A forwards the reconstructed data D e to the challenger C.
• Verify(D e , D)→ q 3 : C compares the actual data D with the reconstructed data D e , and then outputs a boolean value q 3 , where q 3 = 1 if D e = D and q 3 = 0 otherwise. We state the adversary A wins the game if Pr[q 3 = 1] = 1 − negl(ρ). That is to say, the TPA can obtain the user data through the interaction with the cloud, which should be hidden from the TPA. Thereafter, we can conclude the following security definition.
Definition 4: An SCS protocol achieves privacy guarantee if Pr[SG 2 .Verify] → 1] = negl(ρ).
Obviously, our security model is a standard model since no random oracle assumption is involved.
IV. AN SCS PROTOCOL BASED ON RLWE
This section utilizes the classic RLWE to design an SCS protocol. We first describe the design idea, and then show the protocol framework in detail.
A. BASIC IDEA
The rationale lying behind the SCS protocols is that the cloud can compute a verifiable proof using the outsourced data. To this end, we first make user of RLWE to deduce the following theorem. 
where u i is a random integer,
The proof is completed. Then, we utilize Theorem 3 to design an SCS protocol. The user first divides its local data D into L data blocks 
, where u i is the i-th element of the challenge sequence. According to Theorem 3, the user can utilize the cloud proof to judge whether the outsourced data is undamaged or not on the cloud.
However, there are still two problems to be solved in the above design. One is how to distinguish the same data blocks; the other is how to protect the user privacy from the TPA. Next, we show the corresponding countermeasures as follows.
• Distinguishing the same data blocks. To address this problem, the key is to embed the data index information into the data tags. In this way, even though data blocks are the same, the TPA can still distinguish them using their tags. To this end, we will embed the data index i into e i , which is computed using the SamplePre algorithm in Theorem 2 with the input of β = H ξ (i). The reason why the user utilizes the index hash as the input is to resist the malicious attack from the cloud. Please refer to Section V for the detailed explanation.
• Protecting the user privacy from the TPA. To solve this problem, the random masking technique is adopted in the generation of integrity proof. Specifically, the cloud
This also means that the TPA can use (3) to verify the integrity of user data. Based on the above discussion, it can be observed that the RLWE can actually be used to design an SCS protocol, which is denoted as SCS-RLWE in this paper.
B. PROTOCOL DESIGN
The proposed RLWE-SCS follows the classical SCS framework, and thus is also composed of five parts, i.e., KeyGen, Outsource, Audit, Prove, Verify. Each part is illustrated as follows.
KeyGen. The user generates the secret and public keys for the SCS protocol according to the given security parameter ρ. The user first determines a random integer q with ρ-bit and a random vector r ∈ R n q , where n ≥ log 2 (q/σ ) 4log 2 (σ ) and σ is given in advance. The user then utilizes the TrapGen algorithm in Theorem 1 to generate A ∈ R 1×n q and its trapdoor T A . Finally, the user chooses a ρ-bit index ξ determining a secure hash function H ξ (·) with input domain {0, 1} * and output image R q . Thus, the public key PK is q and the secret key SK is the trapdoor T A . The user further publishes A to the cloud and (r, ξ ) to the TPA through two different secure transmission channels.
Outsource. The user first divides its data D into data
where L is the number of all data blocks and d i ∈ R n q . For each data block d i , the user calculates its tag as
q ,σ is computed using the SamplePre algorithm in Theorem 2, whose input element β is set to be H ξ (i). Implicitly, the block index i is embedded in the tag e i , which is important to resist the replace attack. However, this index might be different from the actual block index in the case of inserting and deleting a block, and thus is denoted as tag index to avoid confusion. Finally, all of data blocks and their tags are stored on the cloud together. Although the cloud would spend more space to store data tags, it is very necessary to guarantee the security of the SCS protocol.
Audit. For checking the integrity of the outsourced data, the TPA aperiodically generates an auditing request γ , which contains two parts. One is (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i η ) indicating the challenged data blocks, where 1 ≤ i j ≤ L and 1 ≤ j ≤ η; the other is a ρ-bit index K c that is utilized to compute the challenge sequence u i j = H K c (i j ), where H K c (·) is a secure hash function with input domain {0, 1} * and output image Z q . In this way, an auditing request can be represented as
Prove. Once receiving the auditing request γ , the cloud begins to calculate the integrity proof = (a, b) . For hiding the user privacy from the TPA,
Verify. Once receiving the proof = (a, b), the TPA starts to justify whether b = ar + η j=1 u i j H ξ (i j ) holds or not. If yes, the user data is judged to be still intact; otherwise, it is considered to be lost. No matter what the auditing result is, the TPA would always notify it to the user.
C. PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK
Based on the discussion in the above subsection, the proposed RLWE-SCS framework can be summarized as the following form:
• KeyGen(ρ) → (SK , PK ): With the input of a security level ρ, the user outputs two random ρ-bit integers q and ξ . The user also determines r ∈ R n q , where n ≥ log 2 (q/σ ) 4log 2 (σ ) and σ is given in advance. The user then runs TrapGen algorithm to compute A ∈ R 1×n q and its trapdoor T A . Then, the secret key is SK = T A and the public key is PK = q. Through two different secure transmission channels, A and (r, ξ ) are published to the cloud and the TPA, respectively.
• Outsource(D) → T: With the input of the local data D, the user first divides D into the data blocks
, which is outsourced to the cloud for storage.
• Audit(ρ) → γ : With the input of the security level ρ, the TPA generates the challenged block indices (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i η ), and a random ρ-bit index K c . Both of these two parts constitute an auditing request
• Prove(T, γ ; PK ) → : With the input of the outsource data T and the auditing request γ , the cloud first computes the challenge sequence ( • Verify(γ , ; r) → {0, 1}: With the input of the auditing request γ , the cloud proof , and the public parameters, the TPA checks whether b = ar + η j=1 u i j H ξ (i j ) holds. If yes, the TPA outputs 1 denoting that the outsourced data is intact; otherwise, outputs 0 denoting that the outsourced data is damaged. The TPA notifies the verification result to the user.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the proposed RLWE-SCS protocol in theory from three aspects: proving correctness, cheating resistance and privacy guarantee.
A. PROVING CORRECTNESS
From RLWE-SCS, the TPA checks the data integrity through judging whether b = ar + i u i H ξ (i) holds or not. Thus, the cloud with undamaged data is always able to pass the integrity verification of the TPA. Thereafter, the proposed RLWE-SCS can guarantee the proving correctness effectively.
B. CHEATING RESISTANCE
The formal definition of cheating resistance has been shown in Definition 1. We can find that the cheating resistance is guaranteed by two negligible probabilities: Pr[SG 1 
On one hand, r and ξ can hardly be solved using (4) because of two unknown variables in one equation.
On the other hand, r is also almost unsolvable from the equation t i = d i · r + e i since it is just an RLWE hardness problem. In addition, both q and ξ have ρ bits, hence the probability of brute-attack on r and ξ to satisfy (4) is only 1 2 ρ(n+1) . This means that in the case of auditing a single packet, the cloud can hardly utilize the forge attack to successfully cheat the TPA. Using the linear combinations of (4) with i = 1, 2, . . . , L, the cloud can construct the verification equation for the auditing request against multiple blocks. In this case, the number of unknown variables is still more than that of the equations, and thus the cloud is also unable to cheat the TPA with the forge attack. Secondly, we discuss about the replace attack. Suppose that data blocks (d i 1 , d i 2 , . . . , d i η ) have been lost. For an auditing request against these lost blocks, the cloud replaces them with other undamaged ones (d j 1 , d j 2 , . . . , d j η ) , where 1 ≤ k ≤ η. The cloud utilizes these replaced blocks to compute the integrity proof (a i , b i ). In such way, one can obtain b i = a i r + η k=1 u i k H ξ (j k ), which is contradictory with the verification equation in RLWE-SCS.Verify. Thereafter, the replace attack is also invalid. Thirdly, we demonstrate that the replay attack can be detected by the TPA. Suppose that the previous integrity proof is (a i , b i ), which is computed using the previous auditing request γ i = {(i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i η ), K c i }. Under the replay attack, the cloud directly feeds the previous proof (a i , b i ) back to the TPA as the response of a new auditing request γ j = {(j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j η ), K c j }. This previous proof can pass the TPA verification only in the case of = (a i , b i ) . 4: if the integrity proof i is valid then 5: The TPA forwards γ i and i to the user. where
It is clear that the cloud without ξ can hardly make (5) hold. Since the probability of solving ρ-bit ξ by the cloud is only 1 2 ρ , the replay attack is disabled. To sum up, even though the cloud with the damaged data launches the forge, replace and replay attacks, it still cannot pass the integrity verification of the TPA with the non-negligible probability, i.e., Pr[SG 1 .Vefity
Recall that the key of SG 1 .Reconstruct is to recover user data from the integrity proof. Thus, we first introduce a data reconstructing scheme in Algorithm 1, whose proof is straightforward and thus is omitted. Since Pr[SG 1 .Vefity → 1] = negl(ρ) has been proven, the user in Algorithm 1 almost have no chance to invoke
Step 6 to reconstruct the forged data. Thus, the cloud can hardly cheat its user to accept the false data as its actual one, i.e., Pr[SG 1 
Based on the above discussion, the following theorem can be concluded:
Theorem 4: The protocol RLWE-SCS = (KeyGen, Outsource, Audit, Prove, Verify) is cheating resistant.
C. PRIVACY GUARANTEE
Based on the Definition 4, this subsection demonstrate that the proposed RLWE-SCS can effectively protect the user privacy from the TPA.
Theorem 5: The protocol RLWE-SCS = (KeyGen, Outsource, Audit, Prove, Verify) has the ability to protect the user privacy from the TPA.
Proof: In SG 2 .Reconstruct, the data reconstructing is performed by the TPA. Similar to the proof of cheating resistance, we also start to prove privacy guarantee from auditing only one block d i . Using the cloud proof (a i , b i ), the TPA can generate the following system of equations:
There are two unknown variables in (6) . However, the second equation in (6) is actually the same as the first one. Thus, it is almost impossible to solve d i and A using (6) . Namely, the TPA can hardly reconstruct the user data d i in the case of auditing a single block. For auditing multiple blocks, the corresponding system of verification equations can be directly obtained through the linear combination of (6) . In this case, the number of unknown variables is still more than that of valid equations, hence it is also almost impossible for the TPA to reconstruct the challenged blocks. Due to the elements in d i with ρ bits, we can conclude Pr[SG 2 .Verify → 1] = negl(ρ). Namely, it is almost impossible for the TPA to reconstruct the user data.
VI. SUPPORTING DATA DYNAMICS
It is common that the user frequently updates its data. Thus, it is necessary to extend the proposed RLWE-SCS to support data dynamics, i.e., inserting, deleting and modifying data blocks. Generally, block and tag indices might become inconsistent after data dynamics, which would invalidate the integrity verification in RLWE-SCS. To address this problem, we introduce a constant-size cache in the TPA to maintain the relationship between the data and tag indices. The details are as follows.
A. DESIGN DETAILS
Suppose there are two arrays in the cache, denoted as insert_index_array and del_index_array. These two arrays are utilized to store the indices of the insereted and deleted blocks, respectively. Let current_index denote the indices of the newly inserting data blocks, L denote the number of all data blocks. Initially, the TPA sets insert_index_array = del_index_array = ∅; the user sets current_index = L and notifies L to the TPA.
There are three types of data updating operations, i.e., data insertion, deletion and modification. Thus, we also show how to support data dynamics from three aspects.
• Data deletion. Once deleting an existed data block d i , the user sends (i, 'Del') to the cloud and the TPA, where 'Del' indicates a data deleting operation. After receiving (i, 'Del'), the cloud deletes the i-th element (d i , t i ), and the TPA appends i to del_index_array, i.e., del_index_array = {del_index_array, i}.
• Data insertion. Once inserting a new data block d i , the user assigns its index as current_index + 1 and then generates its tag as t i = d i · r + e current_index+1 , where e current_index+1 is computed using the SamplePre algorithm with the input of β = H ξ (current_index + 1). The user outsources (d i , t i ) to the cloud and increases current_index by 1. The user sends (i, 'Ins') to the cloud and the TPA, where 'Ins' indicates a data inserting operation. Then, the cloud inserts (d i , t i ) into the i-th position, and the TPA appends i to insert_index_array, i.e., insert_index_array = {insert_index_array, i}.
• Data modification. Once modifying an existed data block d i into d i , the user first deletes the original block d i and then inserts the new block d i , which can be implemented using the methods in Data deletion and Data Insertion. With the help of insert_index_array and del_index_ array, the TPA can easily obtain the tag indices of all audited data blocks. Then, the TPA can check the integrity of the outsourced data using
where j and i j denote the block and tag indices, respectively. In this way, the proposed RLWE-SCS can be successfully extended to support data dynamics, which is summarized in Algorithm 2. Since the proposed Algorithm 2 can avoid recomputing the tags of the data blocks that are not updated, the efficiency of supporting data dynamic can be greatly improved.
Algorithm 2 Data Dynamics in RLWE-SCS

Input:
The system parameters of RLWE-SCS. Output: The data updating operations in the user, the cloud and the TPA. The user sends (i, 'Del') to both the cloud and the TPA.
5:
The cloud deletes the i-th element (d i , t i ).
6:
The TPA updates del_index_array = {del_index_ array, i}. 7: else if inserting a data block d i then 8: The user sends (d i , t i ) to the cloud, where t i = d i · r + e current_index+1 . The user updates current_index = current_index + 1.
9:
The user sends (i, 'Ins') to both the cloud and the TPA.
10:
The cloud inserts (d i , t i ) into the i-th position.
11:
The TPA updates insert_index_array = {insert_ index_ array, i}. 12: else if modifying a data block d i to d i then 13: This operation can be completed through repeating
Step 3-11. 14: end if
B. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
Although Algorithm 2 can support data dynamics, there is still one problem. If the user frequently updates its data, the size of insert_index_array and del_index_array in the TPA might become very large. To meet this challenge, the tag indices of the outsourced data should be periodically renormalized to [ 1, 2, . . . , L ] , where L is the number of all data blocks after data updating. In this way, the tag indices become the same as the the block indices again. Then, insert_index_array and del_index_array are no longer needed in the integrity verification and thus can be emptied. Next, we show how to empty the TPA cache periodically.
Denote the tag indices of the outsourced data as [i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i L ], which is nonconsecutive and out of order after data dynamics. To reset these tag indices from 1 to L , the user can send a reset message (e j − e i j ) to the cloud, where j = 1, 2, . . . , L . Once receiving the reset message, the cloud computes t j = t j + (e j − e i j ). In this way, the tag indices of outsourced data become consecutive again and equal to the block indices. Then, both insert_index_array and del_index_array can be emptied to free storage recourse. This resetting procedure of tag indices is invoked periodically no matter when the cache exceeds the given threshold. Thereafter, we can utilize a constant-size cache to extend RLWE-SCS to support data dynamics.
C. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS WORKS
Until now, there are several algorithms to support data dynamics in the design of SCS protocols [10] , [11] , [25] , [26] . The algorithm in [10] is based on an index table, whose size increases with the number of all data blocks. The algorithm in [11] is designed using a merkle hash tree (MHT) [27] , which however cannot thwart the malicious attacks from the cloud. Although the recent works [25] , [26] proposed two different algorithms based on a constant-size cache, they require more storage space than our proposed algorithm. In addition, the existing algorithms to support data dynamics are designed in the SCS model without the TPA. To sum up, our proposed algorithm can efficiently support data dynamics in the third-party auditing SCS protocol, which incurs a little additional workload.
VII. SUPPORT BATCH AUDITING
This section shows how to extend the proposed RLWE-SCS to support batch auditing. In this way, the TPA can audit multiple users' data at the same time. Keep this demand in mind, we slightly modify the proposed RLWE-SCS so that K verification equations can be aggregated into a single one. As a result, our proposed protocol can be extended to support batch auditing. The basic idea is as follows.
Suppose that there are K users in the cloud storage system, whose identities are denoted as ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID K , respectively. For convenience, we assume that each user has the same number of L blocks to be outsourced. For any user k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }, its outsourced data is denoted as D k
, and its data tag is computed as
,σ . Note that e k,i is computed using the SamplePre algorithm with the input of
q and VOLUME 7, 2019 k = 1, 2, . . . , K . The cloud then feeds all (a k , b k )'s back to the TPA. For checking the data integrity of all K users, the TPA can verify whether the following equation holds:
where
. The proof of (8) is as follows.
Proof:
The proof is completed. Based on the above analysis, our batch auditing protocol can be concluded as the following form.
• KeyGen(ρ) → (SK , PK ): With the input of a security parameter ρ, each user k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K } generates two random ρ-bit integers q and ξ . Each user k also determines r k ∈ R n q , where n ≥ log 2 (q/σ ) 4log 2 (σ ) and σ is given in advance. Each user k then runs TrapGen algorithm to compute A k ∈ R 1×n q and its trapdoor T A k . Finally, each user k obtains the secret key SK = T A k and the public key PK = q k . Through the different secure transmission channels, A k and (r k , ξ k ) are respectively published to the cloud and the TPA, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K .
• Outsource(D)→T: With the input of the local data
,σ is computed using the SamplePre algorithm with the input of β = H ξ k (ID k ||i). Finally, all K users respectively outsource their data blocks and tags to the cloud, which are denoted as T.
• Audit(ρ) → γ : This algorithm is the same as the RLWE-SCS.Audit and thus is omitted here.
• Prove(T, γ ; PK ) → : With the input of the outsourced data T and the auditing request γ , the cloud first computes the challenge sequence (u i 1 , u i 2 , . . . , u i η ) using
The cloud then generates the integrity proof by computing
, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K . All of these pairs constitute the integrity proof = { (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ) , . . . , (a K , b K )}.
• Verify(γ , ; r) → {0, 1}: With the input of the auditing query γ , the cloud proof , and the public parameters, the TPA checks whether
If yes, the TPA accepts the integrity proof and outputs 1; otherwise, rejects it and outputs 0. Note that the verification equation (8) only holds when all integrity proofs are valid, and fails when even only a single proof is invalid. Generally, the ratio of the invalid proofs to the valid proofs is quite small. To find out these invalid proofs in the batch auditing, the recursive dived-and conquer method is usually adopted [11] .
VIII. SECURE CLOUD STORAGE PROTOCOL BASED ON LATTICE CRYPTOGRAPHIES
This section presents a general framework to design SCS protocols based on a given lattice cryptography, which is denoted as L-SCS = (KeyGen, Outsource, Audit, Prove, Verify).
In SCS protocols, the outsourced data comprises of data blocks d i and their tags t i , where i = 1, 2, . . . , L. Thus, the chosen lattice cryptography should yield the equation f (x 1 , x 2 ; SK ) = 0, where SK can hardly be computed using x 1 and x 2 . Then, the user can compute t i to make f d i , t i ; SK = 0 hold, which however cannot thwart replace attack. To address this problem, it is necessary to incorporate the data index i into the block tag t i , and thus the user computes t i using f h(d i , i), t i ; SK = 0, where h(·) is a simple function. On the other hand, we should ensure that the cloud integrity proof (u, v) satisfies g(u, v; SK ) = 0. Then, the TPA can verify the integrity of the outsourced data by judging whether g(u, v; SK ) = 0 is true or not. Following this rationale, the framework of L-SCS is described as the following form.
• KeyGen(ρ) → (SK , PK ): With the input of a security level ρ, the user outputs a secret key SK and a public key PK .
• Outsource(D; SK ) → T: With the input of user data D to be outsourced, the user divides D into blocks • Audit(ρ) → γ : This algorithm is the same as the RLWE-SCS.Audit.
• Prove(T, γ ; PK ) → : With the input of the auditing request γ and the outsourced data T, the cloud
, where u i j = H K c (i j ), the functions g 1 and g 2 are determined by making g(u, v; SK ) = 0 hold. The cloud responses = (u, v) to the TPA for proving the integrity of the outsourced data.
• Verify(γ , ; SK ) → {0, 1}: With the input of the integrity proof = (u, v), the TPA checks data integrity through judging whether g(u, v; SK ) = 0 holds or not. If yes, the TPA ouputs 1; otherwise, outputs 0. The proposed L-SCS protocol also satisfies proving correctness, cheating resistance, privacy guarantee, and supports data dynamics and batch auditing. The proof is similar as that of the RLWE-SCS in the previous sections. Note that, not all lattice cryptographies can be transformed into SCS protocols using L-SCS, such as the shortest vector problem (SVP) [28] and approximating the shortest vector problem (A-SVP) [29] , etc. The reason is that these lattice cryptographies cannot yield the equation f (x 1 , x 2 ; SK ) = 0. For example, in the SVP problem is any given lattice and α is its shortest vector, such that x 1 and x 2 cannot be obtained to construct f (x 1 , x 2 ; SK ) = 0.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide the detailed performance analysis of the proposed RLWE-SCS, which is mainly from the computation, storage and communication costs. We also give the performance comparison between RLWE-SCS and the previous protocols. For the sake of description, we denote |D| as the size of the outsourced data, psf as the computation cost of the SamplePre algorithm. For ease of description, we focus mainly on the highest order of the cost polynomials, which is the most representative.
A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) COMPUTATION COST
We analyze the computation cost from the perspective of the user, the cloud and the TPA, respectively. Their computation costs are given as follows: (nλ 2 + psf )L in the user generated by computing the data tags of all outsourced data, nηλ 2 in the cloud generated by calculating the integrity proof of the challenged data, nηλ 2 in the TPA generated by checking the integrity of the challenged data.
2) STORAGE COST
We also analyze the storage cost from the perspective of the user, the cloud and the TPA, respectively. For both the user and the TPA, they only need to store several system parameters, and thus their storage costs are both nλ. For the cloud, it needs to store all data blocks and their tags in addition to the system parameters, which thus requires about 2|D| storage cost.
3) COMMUNICATION COST
There are two types of the communication cost, including the offline and online ones. In the offline phase, the user needs to outsource all data blocks and their tags to the cloud. This operation contributes the most of the offline communication cost, which is roughly 2|D|. In the online phase, the communication cost is mainly generated by auditing requests and integrity proofs, which is about (n + η)λ.
B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
This subsection compares the proposed RLWE-SCS with the previous lattice-based SCS works. The comparisons are summarized in Table 1 . It can be observed that RLWE-SCS has lower storage, communication and computation costs than the previous works. In addition, 1) Xu et al. [14] and Liu and Cao [15] cannot support public auditing since they are unable to protect the data privacy from the TPA. Thus, the user has to audit the outsourced data itself instead of resorting to the TPA. For these two protocols, the computation and storage cost of the TPA are expressed by the symbol − in Tabel 1.
2) The previous works don't involve data dynamics and batch auditing, which results in the limitation of their applications.
3) Liu and Cao [15] cannot thwart the malicious attacks from the cloud, making it insecure in practice.
In summary, the proposed RLWE-SCS has the superiority over the existing lattice-based SCS protocols, which is mainly because our protocol only involves vector variables instead of matrix ones. This provides a simple way to extend the SCS protocol to support public auditing, data dynamic and batch auditing, while keeping the storage, communication and computation costs low.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first propose a novel SCS protocol based on RLWE, i.e. RLWE-SCS, which can resist quantum attacks. We then present a new security model of SCS protocols without any random oracle assumption, and prove that RLWE-SCS is strictly secure under this model. We also extend RLWE-SCS to support data dynamics and batch auditing with low overheads. Furthermore, we propose a generic framework to design SCS protocols based on lattice cryptographies. At last, we conduct exhaustive performance evaluation of the proposed RLWE-SCS. It can be observed that compared with the existing lattice-based SCS protocols, the proposed RLWE-SCS has lower total overheads and supports more practical functions.
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